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ABSTRACT
This study aims to examine the relationship between multiple directorships and the monitoring role of the board of directors 
in Malaysian listed companies (PLC). The monitoring role is proxied by the percentage of directors’ attendance in board 
meetings, as attending meetings provides directors with resources about the management actions and assists directors 
to exercise their role effectively. The study uses a sample of 1023 directors from 134 companies on the Main Market of 
Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Bourse) in year 2008. The results of the study show that the incidence of multiple directorships 
is low. Independent directors are found to have more multiple directorships. Directors with multiple directorships are 
older directors, have less director ownerships and are on boards with a high fraction of independent directors. Based 
on the 75% cut-off for the percentage of meetings’ attendance, the logistic regression suggests that no agency cost is 
associated with multiple directorships. However, the tendency to be absent from board meetings is associated with the 
high number of board meetings whilst the tendency to attend more board meetings is associated with the increase in 
age, tenure, and director ownership.
Keywords: Corporate governance; multiple directorships; board meetings attendance; director ownership; tenure; firm 
performance; Malaysia
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji hubungan di antara pelbagai jawatan pengarah dan peranan pemantauan oleh 
lembaga pengarah dalam syarikat-syarikat tersenarai Malaysia (PLC). Peranan pemantauan adalah diproksikan kepada 
peratusan kehadiran Pengarah dalam mesyuarat lembaga yang mana menghadiri mesyuarat menyediakan mereka 
dengan sumber-sumber mengenai tindakan pihak pengurusan dan membantu mereka menjalankan peranan dengan 
berkesan. Kajian ini menggunakan sampel 1023 pengarah daripada 134 syarikat di Pasaran Utama Bursa Malaysia 
(Bursa Malaysia) pada tahun 2008. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan pelbagai jawatan pengarah adalah 
rendah. Pengarah bebas didapati mempunyai lebih banyak pelbagai jawatan pengarah. Pengarah dengan pelbagai 
jawatan pengarah adalah terdiri daripada pengarah yang berumur, mempunyai kurang pemilikan pengarah dan 
berada di lembaga pengarah yang mempunyai pecahan pengarah bebas yang tinggi. Berdasarkan 75% peratusan 
kehadiran mesyuarat, regresi logistik menunjukkan tiada kos agensi yang berkaitan dengan pelbagai pengarah. Walau 
bagaimanapun, kecenderungan untuk ponteng mesyuarat lembaga dikaitkan dengan bilangan tinggi mesyuarat lembaga 
manakala kecenderungan untuk menghadiri mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah lebih dikaitkan dengan peningkatan umur, 
tempoh perkhidmatan, dan pemilikan pengarah.
Kata kunci: Tadbir urus korporat; pelbagai jawatan pengarah; kehadiran mesyuarat lembaga; pemilikan pengarah; 
tempoh perkhidmatan; prestasi firma; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Outside directors are an important governance mechanism 
to monitor the decisions of the management and executive 
directors to ensure that the decisions are in line with 
the interests of the other outside shareholders (Fama 
1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). Their experience in other 
companies in a similar industry would make them 
qualified as business advisers with less transaction costs 
incurred by the companies. They are expected to bring 
independence to the board and add to the diversity of skills 
and expertise of the directors (Abdullah 2004). However, 
the findings from studies on the effectiveness of outside 
directors, particularly the effectiveness of the monitoring 
role of independent directors, are mostly found to be 
insignificant. Several studies have suggested that having 
excessive multiple directorships is one of the factors that 
leads to directors not producing a positive effect on firm 
performance (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Jackling & Johl 
2009), management oversight role (Kamardin & Haron 
2011a), or the strategic role performed by the directors 
(Kamardin & Haron 2011b).
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Multiple directorships or outside directorships refer 
to the number of external appointments held by corporate 
directors (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard 2003). Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) define multiple directorships as 
directors sitting on more than one board. The effect 
of multiple directorships can be viewed from two 
perspectives. The first perspective, Quality Hypothesis, 
views multiple directorships as a proxy for high director 
quality (Fama 1980; Fama & Jansen 1983). Directors with 
multiple directorships by virtue of more networks are 
expected to generate benefits by helping to bring in needed 
resources, suppliers and customers to a company (Booth 
& Deli 1996). They would have more experiences and 
knowledge about industry. Directors who have experience 
in related strategies are expected to be more capable of 
contributing to the strategic decision process (Ruigrok, 
Peck & Keller 2006; Carpenter & Westphal 2001). Another 
perspective, Busyness Hypothesis, assumes that directors 
who serve on multiple boards become so busy that they 
cannot monitor management adequately, which then leads 
to high agency costs. Accordingly, directors who serve 
on multiple boards would be overcommitted, and as a 
consequence, they tend to shirk their responsibilities.
In the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2012, multiple directorships are one of the concerns in 
relation to directors’ commitment. Accordingly, directors 
in Malaysian public listed companies are recommended 
to hold a maximum of five directorships. Prior to that, 
the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG) in 
2009 also suggested limiting the directorships of the 
independent directors to five directorships. This practice 
is not surprising because of the high limit of directorships 
allowable to directors. Section III of the Bursa Malaysia 
Practice Note no. 13 and Bursa Listings Requirements 
allow directors to have up to 25 directorships, 10 in public 
companies and 15 in non-public companies. The number 
is higher in Malaysia compared to the US, where a director 
holding less than three multiple directorships is often 
considered as the best practice. “Busy directors” in the US 
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships 
(Ferris et al. 2003; Sarkar & Sarkar 2009). However, in 
Malaysia, multiple directorships of independent directors 
are found to be common among listed firms (Haniffa & 
Cooke 2002).
Despite all the concerns, empirically, little is known 
about the extent of multiple directorship practices by 
different types of directors in public listed companies in 
Malaysia. How critical are the multiple directorships in 
Malaysia? Do multiple directorships bring benefits or 
costs to the companies? Thus, the first objective of this 
study is to examine the extent of multiple directorships 
in Malaysian listed companies. The findings of the 
study provide further evidences of whether multiple 
directorships are indeed an emerging concern to corporate 
governance practices and extend the literature on the 
multiple directorships in Malaysia. The second objective is 
to examine the effect of board of directors’ characteristics 
with the monitoring role of board of directors as proxied 
by the directors’ attendance in the board meetings. These 
findings will provide some inputs to the accounting 
policymakers, regulators and researchers related to the 
current practices of multiple directorships and board 
characteristics in Malaysia.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The board of directors plays a significant role in 
ensuring the survival and success of a company. The 
directors observe managers to make sure they act in 
the interests of the shareholders. In the concentrated 
ownership environment in Malaysia, where substantial 
shareholders serve as managers, the role of directors 
also includes the protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests. As an important internal mechanism to monitor 
the performance of managers and to protect the interests 
of shareholders, the Malaysian Corporate Governance 
Blueprint 2011 explicated that good corporate governance 
is the responsibility of the board of directors who act as 
active and responsible fiduciaries. The following sections 
provide the literature review and hypotheses development 
of the director characteristics (multiple directorships, 
age, tenure, gender and director ownership), board 
characteristics (board size, independent directors and 
board meetings), and firm characteristics (firm size and 
firm profitability).
ATTENDANCE AT BOARD OF DIRECTOR MEETINGS
Attending board meetings is considered as one way through 
which board members can contribute to formulating and 
implementing the strategy roles and monitoring roles 
(Davies 1991; Vafeas 1999). Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt 
and Ning (2009) highlight the difficulty in measuring the 
link between multiple directorships and firm performance, 
as it requires all possible exogenous variables that affect 
the relation and proper modelling is required to tackle the 
endogeneity issues. They suggest a study of the monitoring 
activity of directors. Even though the monitoring activity 
is not easy to observe, using directors’ absence at board 
meetings is suggested as the proxy for the directors 
exercising their role in board meetings. The current study 
adopts the method of Jiraporn et al. (2009) to proxy the 
monitoring role. The benefits and costs of the monitoring 
role are proxied by the percentage of attendance of board 
meetings. Attending meetings provides directors with the 
information concerning the management decisions and 
makes them more effective in exercising their monitoring 
role.
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS
According to the ‘quality hypothesis,’ directors with 
more multiple directorships are expected to have more 
exposure to certain tasks and procedures, which can be 
implemented in another company to provide effective 
monitoring (Beasey 1996; Mohd Salleh et al. 2005; Sarkar 
& Sarkar 2005; Tan 2005). Directors who have experience 
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in related strategies are expected to be more capable of 
contributing to the strategic decision process (Carpenter 
& Westphal 2001). On the other hand, according to the 
‘busyness hypotheses,’ if directors have too many board 
assignments, they may have limited time and attention 
for a company (Jackling & Johl 2009; Ferris et al. 2003; 
Kamardin & Haron 2009; Sarkar & Sarkar 2005; Vafeas 
1999). Less time is given to closely scrutinizing the 
internal control system, which leads to less effectiveness 
in monitoring the managers. Since building up knowledge 
about the company and its industry is time intensive, busy 
directors may undermine their ability to discharge their 
role (Ferris et al. 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Murphy 
& McIntyre 2007).
Jiraporn et al. (2009) examined the relationship 
between multiple directorships and directors’ absence in 
the board and audit committee meetings, and found that 
outside directorships lead to the likelihood of absence 
in meetings. Their results support the agency cost of 
multiple directorships. Kamardin and Haron (2009) 
showed that multiple directorships are negative and 
significantly related to the strategic roles performed by 
directors. The results lend support for directors having 
less multiple directorships in order to be effective in the 
strategic role. The results of the study are consistent with 
those of Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Ruigrok et 
al. (2006). Lack of time and specific knowledge may 
constrain directors’ involvement in strategic decision-
making (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Thus, multiple directorships 
are expected to be associated with high agency cost. With 
regards to the attendance of board meetings, busy directors 
are expected to be less likely to attend board meetings. 
H1 Directors with a large number of outside directorships 
are less likely to attend board meetings.
AGE AND TENURE
Spliker and Prawitt (1995) associate relevant experience 
and knowledge with certain tasks developed from 
experience. Previous studies in management used 
demographic characteristics, such as age and tenure, to 
proxy manager knowledge (Zander 1994). The knowledge 
acquired by the BOD is assumed to improve the quality 
of actions taken. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) provide 
evidence that a BOD, having experience in a particular 
situation or having specific expertise, would be likely to 
affect their role in monitoring managers and providing 
services to the board. Weir (1964) and Kirchner (1958) 
argue that the process of decision making and the quality of 
that decision depends on the age of the decision-maker. The 
age of the manager can also have an effect on the selection 
and perspective on strategic decision-making (Wiersema 
& Bantel 1992). Further, Mclntyre, Murphy and Mitchell 
(2007), and Taylor (1975) find that managerial age has a 
relationship with the performance of decision-making, and 
in turn, will affect a company’s growth. To remain longer 
on the board, directors have to show excellent performance 
in their roles. In order to develop all the skills and bring 
better cognitive resources to decision-making tasks, older 
directors and longer tenure directors would be expected 
to attend more board meetings.
H2 Older directors are less likely to be absent from the 
board meetings.
H3 Longer tenure directors are less likely to be absent 
from the board meetings.
GENDER
The issue of gender is a concern in Malaysia as highlighted 
by the corporate governance blueprint 2011, which focuses 
on greater diversity in the BOD including gender diversity. 
Women are shown to be under-represented on the board 
as they only comprise 7.5% of the total directors while 
forming approximately 50% of the workforce (The Edge 
Financial Today 2011). In addition, Malaysia has about 
23% of women at the senior management level, which is 
similar to the United States and higher than the UK (19%) 
(Grant Thorton International Business 2007). In Asian 
countries, Malaysia is in third place after the Philippines 
(50%) and Thailand (39%). However, women on the board 
of the top European companies grew to 12% in 2010, 
from 8% in 2004. The Women, Family and Community 
Development Ministry has targeted to have at least a 30% 
representation of women in a decision-making position 
in the corporate sector by 2016. A study by Korn/Ferry 
International Asia Pacific (2011) using a sample of 100 
domestic companies by market capitalisation in Australia, 
Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore 
shows that more than 70% of the boards in these countries, 
except for Australia, have no female independent directors. 
Peterson and Philpot (2007) examine the role of female 
directors of the US Future 500 firms and show that female 
directors are less likely to sit on the executive committee, 
and are more likely to sit on the public affairs committee. 
However, there is no gender bias in director assignment 
to other board committees. Rose (2007) shows that there 
is no significant relationship between female board 
representation and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) in 
Danish firms. However, Huse et al. (2009) report that in 
relation to board effectiveness (i.e. board control tasks), 
the contribution of women is varied depending on the 
board tasks. 
Agency costs theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
is the predominant theory oftenly used to explain the 
relationship between board of directors and firms’ corporate 
governance. It is implied from agency costs theory that 
gender diversity would bring greater independence in the 
board. The more diverse is the board in terms of gender, 
the more independent the board management and decision 
making processes are. Greater gender diversity means 
higher independence on the board which consequently 
would result in better alignment of shareholders and 
managerial objectives. Resource dependency theory 
postulates that an organisation depends on resources which 
originate from external environment. The theory argues 
that the board is regarded as a vital recourses as it provides 
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linkage and networking to inter-organisations and external 
environment (Hillman, Wither & Collins 2009). Therefore, 
regardless of gender, both male and female directors are 
essential resources to the firms that can greatly increase 
companies sources of expertise, sources of resources and 
networking. Both male and female directors are expected 
to attend more meetings to participate in the decision 
making and play their role accordingly. 
H4 Gender diversity is less likely to affect directors’ 
attendance to board meetings.
DIRECTORS’ OWNERSHIP
Directors’ ownership provides direct incentives for 
directors to act in line with shareholders’ interests as 
the wealth of the directors is tied to the performance of 
the firm (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Brickley et al. 1988; 
Weisbach 1988). Several studies, such as Han and Suk 
(1998), Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Filatotchev et al. (2005) 
and Krivogorsky (2006) find that the presence of larger 
directors’ ownership reduces agency costs, and therefore 
increases performance. However, Fauzias et al. (1999), 
Chang (2003) and Lin, Huang and Young (2008) find that 
performance is negatively and significantly related to board 
ownership. Therefore, the results of the influence of the 
board or director ownership on performance are mixed. The 
concentrated ownership in Malaysia, which is controlled 
by managers and family members, might have some 
implications on the decision making process of the board 
of directors. Thus, it is expected that directors with large 
shareholdings are more likely to attend board meetings.
H5 Directors with large shareholdings are less likely to 
be absent from the board meetings.
BOARD SIZE
Larger board size would mean that more resources are 
available to the board. Board members can share their 
expertise, knowledge and experience in the process of 
decision making (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). Uadiale 
(2010) proposes that companies should have a larger 
board size since a larger board can protect companies 
resources, which are limited (Pearce & Zahra 1992). 
Similarly, Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) 
imply that large board size can increase the performance 
of companies because they have a connection with the 
external resources. However, Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
(1996) argue that agency problems exist when the size 
of the board increases as it is difficult to communicate, 
coordinate and make a decision, and it also reduces the 
capability of the board to manage the organization. In the 
case of the attendance of board meetings, the agency cost 
created by larger board size would increase the likelihood 
of being absent from meetings as other directors are 
expected to attend.
H6 A board with large board size is more likely to have 
directors absent from the board meetings.
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Independent directors play an important role in monitoring 
management (Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983) and 
enhancing the effectiveness of the board. They are 
expected to bring independent views to the board and 
add to the diversity of skills and expertise of the directors 
(Abdullah 2004). They also act as business advisers and 
‘watchdogs’ to ensure that managers act in the interests of 
outside shareholders. Recently there has been a growing 
tendency to have a greater proportion of independent 
and non-executive directors to serve on the board. The 
existence of outside independent directors on the board 
has been regarded to be so important that the Malaysian 
Securities Commission made it mandatory that at least 
33% of the directors must be independent (Securities 
Commission 2007). A high percentage of independence 
is required because boards are less likely to exert control 
over management when they lack independence from the 
management (Carpenter & Westphal 2001). For monitoring 
purposes, independent directors are expected to attend 
more board meetings in order to monitor management 
decisions and protect the shareholders’ interests.
H7 A board with more independent directors is less likely 
to have members absent from the board meetings.
FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETINGS
Jensen (1993) argues that the board in a well-functioning 
firm should be relatively inactive and exhibit few 
conflicts. In such a firm, the board performs routine board 
tasks. However, the role of a corporate board becomes 
increasingly more important during a crisis. As such, 
frequent board meetings are important as a way to respond 
to the tough years of operations. Vafeas (1999) finds that 
frequency of board meetings is inversely related to firm 
performance. Al-Najjar (2012) examines the determinants 
of board meetings frequency among 120 UK companies 
from 2003-2008. Using multinomial logit regression, the 
study finds that board size positively affect frequency 
of board meetings. In most cases, directors are also 
appointed as members of the board committees. Being 
overcommitted to work, directors having more outside 
directorships are expected to skip some meetings. 
H8 A board with a high frequency of meetings is more 
likely to have members absent from the board 
meetings.
FIRM SIZE
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) reveal that agency 
problems in small sized companies are minimal due to the 
ownership structure in this type of company being closely 
held. The agency problem in large companies is expected 
to be higher due to the separation of ownership and the 
process of decision-making (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
The directors of larger firms are perceived to have more 
skills because of the size and complexity of the operations 
they oversee (Ferris et al. 2003). With the increased 
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complexity in businesses, more experts are required to 
complement the management expertise. Thus, directors 
in large firms are expected to attend more meetings. 
H9 Directors in large firms are less likely to be absent 
from board meetings. 
FIRM PERFORMANCE
There is limited evidence on the relationship between firm 
performance and directors’ attendance to board meetings 
(Vafeas 1999; Jensen 1993; Brick & Chidambaran 2010; 
Al-Najjar 2012). When a company performs poorly, 
directors’ expertise and knowledge in strategic decision 
making, monitoring the strategy implementation and 
management control system, providing services to increase 
company reputation, and providing supplementary 
resources to managers are highly demanded. More 
meetings are expected to be conducted in the year of 
poor performance (Vafeas 1999; Jensen 1993). In this 
situation, directors are expected to attend more meetings. 
The current study argues that firm performance may affect 
directors’ attendance to board meetings.
H10 Directors in companies with poor performance are 
less likely to be absent from board meetings
RESEARCH METHODS
SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample of the study is directors in the companies 
listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia for the 
financial year end 2008. The year 2008 is chosen because 
it is immediately a year after the financial crisis started in 
2007. During this time, board of directors are expected to 
provide more monitoring activities. In addition, the year 
2008 is chosen to check the effectiveness of the revised 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007. Finance 
companies, PN17 companies (distressed firms), REITS, 
closed-end fund, and exchange traded funds are excluded 
from the population. About 20% of companies are selected 
from each industry, resulting in a final sample of 134 
companies. The sample of companies based on industry 
is reported in Table 1 below. 
Of the 1023 directors considered in this study, 443 
(43.3%) are independent directors, 207 (20.2%) are 
non-independent non-executive directors or affiliated 
directors and 373 (36.5%) are executive directors. Detailed 
information concerning the directors relating to the 
outside directorships in public listed companies, directors 
meetings’ attendance, age, tenure, gender, director 
ownership, board size, type of directors, frequency of 
board meetings, total assets and ROA were gathered from 
the annual reports. Only outside directorships in public 
listed companies are considered in this study because 
not all companies provide information about the outside 
directorships in private companies. 
The descriptive statistics for directors’ characteristics, 
board characteristics and firm characteristics in the 
study are analysed. A detailed analysis of the significant 
differences between means was conducted to determine 
whether there are significant differences in multiple 
directorships and directors meeting attendance in relation 
to directors’ characteristics, board characteristics and 
firm characteristics. Logistic regression analyses were 
conducted to examine the effect of directors’ characteristics, 
board characteristics and firm characteristics on directors’ 
meeting attendance. The following model is used in the 
study: 
DIRATD = β0 + β1OUTMD + β2AGE + β3TENURE + 
β4GENDER + β5DIROWN + β6BSIZE + 
β7FRINDP + β8 BMEET+ β9FSIZE + β10FP 
+ ε
Where:
DIRATD Directors’ meeting attendance (1 for 
less than 75%, 0 otherwise)
OUTMD Number of outside directorships 
AGE Age of individual director 
TENURE Tenure of individual director
GENDER Gender (1 for male, 0 for female)
DIROWN Percentage of individual director 
ownership, direct and indirect 
ownership
BSIZE Board size; number of directors on 
the board 
FRINDP Fraction of independent directors 
BMEET Frequency of board meetings
FSIZE Company size; natural log of total 
assets
FP Firm performance as measured by 
ROA in 2007
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 reports the distribution of multiple directorships 
according to different types of director composition and 
directors’ meetings attendance (categorized into two: 
attending less than 75% and 75% and more). There 
TABLE 1. Sample companies based on industry
 Industry Frequency 
 Consumer Product (CP) 25
 Industrial Product (IP) 48
 Trading & Service (TS) 32
 Technology (TECH) 4
 Property (PROP) 8
 Construction (CONST) 8
 Plantation (PLNT) 9
 Total 134
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are 1023 observations on directorships, comprising 
443 independent directors, 207 non-independent non-
executive directors, and 373 executive directors. For all 
directors, about 93.45% and 98.24% of directors have 
0-3 and 0-5 outside directorships respectively; 61.15% 
have 0 outside directorships (or 1 directorship), while 
about 6.55% of the directors have more than three outside 
directorships. The results suggest that the occurrence of 
multiple directorships is considered low.
Approximately 88.49% of independent directors 
and 94.20% of non-independent non-executive (NINE) 
directors have 0 to 3 outside directorships. Almost 98% of 
the independent directors have 0-5 outside directorships. 
About 51% of the independent directors and 55% of the 
NINE have one directorship. For the executive directors, 
about 98.93% have 0-3 outside directorships and about 
78% of them have one directorship, which shows that 
executive directors are more focused on their firms. This 
evidence also shows that executive directors are not 
distracted from their jobs as most of them only held the 
post of directors in the firms that they managed.
Following Jiraporn et al. (2009) we use the cut-off 
point for the directors’ meeting attendance at 75%. The 
results show that 948 directors attended 75% and more 
of the board meetings whereby 61.29% and 17.93% of 
them have 0 and 1 outside directorship, respectively. 
About 93.57% have 0-3 outside directorships. 75 directors 
attended less than 75% of the board meetings with 
65.33% and 17.33% have 0 and 1 outside directorships, 
respectively. The results show that the occurrence for 
attending less than 75% and 75% and above for the number 
of outside directorships (0 and 1) is not much different. 
TABLE 2. Distribution of outside directorships
 Number of All directors Independent Non-independent Executive    Director meetings attendance
 outside  directors non-executive directors 
 directorships   directors  Less than 75% 75% and more  
 0 630 (61.58%) 227 (51.24%) 115 (55.56%) 288 (77.21%) 49 (65.33%) 581 (61.29%)
 1 183 (17.89%) 85 (19.19%) 42 (20.29%) 56 (15.01%) 13 (17.33%) 170 (17.93%)
 2 103 (10.07%) 58 (13.09%) 25 (12.08%) 20 (5.36%) 5 (6.67%) 98 (10.34%)
 3 40 (3.91%) 22 (4.97%) 13 (6.28%) 5 (1.34%) 2 (2.67%) 38 (4.01%)
 4 28 (2.74%) 21 (4.74%) 7 (3.38%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.33%) 27 (2.85%)
 5 21 (2.05%) 18 (4.06%) 1 (0.48%)  2 (0.54%) 2 (2.67%) 19 (2.00%)
 6 8 (0.78%) 5 (1.13%) 2 (0.97%)  1 (0.27%) 3 (4.00%) 5 (0.53%)
 7 6 (0.59%) 4 (0.90%) 2 (0.97%)  0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 6 (0.63%)
 8 2 (0.20%) 1 (0.23%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.27%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (0.21%)
 9 2 (0.20%) 2 (0.45%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (0.21%)
 Total 1023 443 207 373 75 948
Table 3 reports the analysis of the significant 
difference for outside directorships and the percentage 
of directors’ attendance of meetings based on the type of 
directors. For the outside directorships the difference in 
means between independent directors and others (NINE 
and executive directors) is statistically significant at 1% 
level. This means that independent directors have more 
outside directorships compared to others. The difference in 
means between executive directors and outside directors is 
also statistically significant at 1% level. The results show 
that executive directors have less outside directorships 
compared to others. For the director meetings’ attendance, 
NINE and executive directors are significantly different 
at 1% level. NINE attended less meetings compared to 
others while executive directors attended more meetings 
compared to others. However, the difference in means for 
meetings’ attendance between independent directors and 
others is not statistically significant at 5% level.
TABLE 3. Analysis of outside directorships and percentage of director meetings’ attendance based on type of directors
       
Type of directors N 
     Outside directorships   Director meetings’ attendance (%)
    Mean t-statistics Mean t-statistics
 Independent directors (INDP):   6.710***  -.196
  1  for independent directors 443 1.19  93.62
  0  for otherwise 580 0.56  93.78 
 Non-independent non-executive directors (NINE):   1.006  -3.143***
  1  for NINE directors 207 0.92  90.97
  0  for otherwise 816 0.81  94.40
 Executive directors (EXEC):   -9.511***  3.192***
  1  for executive directors 373 0.36  95.33
  0  for otherwise 650 1.10  92.77              
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, †p < .10
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Table 4 summarises the statistics of the relevant 
variables. Based on the final sample of 1023 directors, the 
average outside directorships in public listed companies 
is 0.83 with a minimum of 0 and maximum of 9 (i.e. 10 
directorships). On average, the directors’ age for the sample 
is 56 years with a minimum of 26 years and maximum of 
88 years. The average length of tenure serving the board 
is 9 years with the maximum being 46 years. The average 
shareholdings of all directors are 8.26%. The distribution 
for age, tenure, director shareholdings and board size is 
larger with standard deviations of 10.681, 7.399, 16.919, 
and 2.099, respectively. The average board size is about 
8, with a minimum of 4 members and a maximum of 15 
members. The average fraction of independent directors is 
0.43. The average fractions of NINE and executive directors 
are 0.36 and 0.21, respectively. The average number of 
board meetings is 5 with a minimum of 2 and maximum 
of 17. The average size of the sample companies, as 
measured by total assets in 2008, is RM2,020,000,000 
and the average firm performance, as measured by ROA 
in 2007, is 0.081.
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics
  Mean Median Min Max SD
 OUTMD 0.83 0.00 0 9 1.431
 AGE 56.41 56 26 88 10.681
 TENURE 9.32 7.50 1 46 7.399
 GENDER 0.92 1.00 0 1 0.273
 DIROWN (%) 8.26 0.01 0.00 82.76 16.919
 BSIZE 8.15 8 4 15 2.099
 FRINDP 0.43 0.43 0.25 0.80 0.111
 FRNINE 0.36 0.38 0.00 0.67 0.174
 FREXEC 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.57 0.154
 BMEET 5.39 5 2 17 1.995
 FSIZE 2,020,000,000 463,576,000 32,252,896 35,972,700,000 5,196,000,000
 FP 0.081 0.071 -0.48 1.24 1.161
Table 5 shows that there are significant differences in 
the mean for the attendance of meetings by the directors 
between the two groups (i.e. DIRATD = 0, DIRATD = 1) for 
age, tenure, directors’ ownership, fraction of executive 
directors, an0.d frequency of board meetings. Directors 
who attended at least 75% of board meetings (0) are 
older, have longer tenure, and have more shareholdings. 
However, directors who attended less than 75% (1) have a 
higher fraction of executive directors and a higher number 
of board meetings. 
TABLE 5. Analysis of director meetings’ attendance for all independent variables
  Mean (DIRATD = 0) Mean (DIRATD = 1) t-statistics
 OUTMD 0.83 0.81 0.103
 AGE                 56.67                 53.03     2.554**
 TENURE 9.55 6.37       4.183***
 GENDER 0.92 0.89 0.746
 BSIZE 8.12 8.53 -1.469
 DIROWN 8.64 3.37       3.833***
 FRINDP 0.43 0.42 0.789
 FRNINE 0.37 0.33 1.595
 FREXEC 0.20 0.24  -1.789†
 BMEET 5.34 6.05    -2.438**
 FSIZE 2,040,000,000 1,760,000,000 0.043
 FP 0.08 0.07 0.235
 Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, †p < .10
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CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES
Further analysis on the correlation between multiple 
directorships with other director characteristics, board 
characteristics and firm characteristics is reported in 
Table 6. The analysis indicates that directors with multiple 
directorships are older directors and have less shareholdings 
in the company. In terms of board characteristics, directors 
with multiple directorships are found on the board with 
a high fraction of independent directors. Directors with 
longer tenure have more shareholdings. Independent 
directors are found to be positively correlated with the 
number of board meetings. Age, tenure and director 
shareholdings are found to be negatively correlated with 
directors’ attendance of meetings, however, frequency of 
board meetings is positively related.
TABLE 6. Correlation between variables
  OUTMD AGE TENURE GENDER DIROWN BSIZE FRINDP BMEET FSIZE FP DIRATD 
 OUTMD 1          
 AGE .203** 1         
 TENURE .032 .318** 1        
 GENDER .057 .124** -.007 1       
 DIROWN -.115** -.061* .290** -.078* 1      
 BSIZE -.056 -.001 .007 .016 -.061 1     
 FRINDP .103** .094** -.036 -.003 -.089** -.273** 1    
 BMEET -.016 .085** -.204** -.008 -.122** .094** .186** 1   
 FSIZE .172** .176** .058 .010 -.099** .260** .228** .367** 1  
 FP -.009 .087** .040 .022 -.014 .142** -.049 .119** .095** 1 
 DIRATD     -.003 -.088** -.112** -.026 -.081** .052 -.021 .094** -.009 -.008 1
Note: * p < .05, **p < .01  
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 7 reports the results of the logistic regression. For 
this analysis, two outlier directors are excluded because 
the Z residuals are higher than 3.0. The dependent 
variable is directors’ attendance of meetings (DIRATD) as 
a dichotomous value, 1 for attending less than 75%, and 
0 for attending 75% and above. The McFadden R2 and 
the Nagelkerke R2 are 8.90% and 11.20%, respectively, 
and the Chi-square is significant at 1%. The percentage of 
correct classification is 92.8%. The results show that the 
estimated coefficient of outside directorships is positive 
but not statistically significant. This means that directors 
with a high number of outside directorships are not likely 
to be absent from the meetings. The results do not support 
the hypothesis (H1). 
Age, tenure and director shareholdings have negative 
estimated coefficients and are significant at 5%, 1% and 
5%, respectively. This means that older directors and 
longer tenure directors are more likely to attend meetings. 
Directors with large shareholdings are more likely to 
attend meetings. The results support the hypotheses (H2, 
H3 & H5). However, directors are likely to attend fewer 
meetings for boards with an increasing number of board 
meetings (H8). The results also show that gender (either 
male or female), board size, fraction of independent 
directors, firm size and firm performance are not related to 
the tendency of directors to attend less board meetings. 
Considering the high mean for meeting attendance 
in the sample, an analysis using the 80% cut-off for the 
categorisation of percentage of meetings attendance 
into DIRATD (1 for less than 80%, 0 otherwise) is also 
conducted. The results show that the same significant 
variables (AGE, TENURE, DIROWN & BMEET) remain. 
TABLE 7. Logistic regression analysis
  β (Wald statistics)
 OUTMD 0.082 (0.850)
 AGE -0.033 (6.056)**
 TENURE -0.087 (8.181)***
 GENDER -0.332 (0.649)
 DIROWN -0.028 (4.479)**
 BSIZE 0.104  (2.669)
 FRINDP -1.230  (0.848)
 BMEET 0.136 (5.708)**
 FSIZE -0.125 (1.492)
 FP -0.214 (0.082)
 Constant 1.646 (0.841)
 N 1021
 Chi-Square 47.087 (df = 10) ***
 Cox & Snell R2 4.50%
 Nagelkerke R2 11.20%
 Mc Fadden R2 8.90%
 Hosmer & Lemeshow 8.71 (df = 8)
 Percentage correct 92.8%
 Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05
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ROBUST REGRESSION RESULTS
Three regression methods are used to evaluate the 
robustness of previous analysis, which are forward (Wald) 
step-wise logistic regression, logit regression using 
robust standard error and Tobit regression with robust 
standard error. A control variable, debt ratio (DEBT) is also 
introduced in the robust analysis. Debt ratio is the value of 
total debt scaled by total assets in 2008. Table 8 compares 
the results of the three methods of regressions.
The results remain significantly the same using 
forward step-wise logistic regression (column one) 
where only four variables are significant in explaining 
directors’ attendance. TENURE and AGE are negatively 
and significantly associated with directors’ attendance at 
1% level. DIROWN has a significant negative relationship 
with directors’ attendance at 5% level. On the other hand, 
BMEET is significantly and positively associated with 
director attendance.
There are few differences in the magnitude or 
significance of the variables when logit with robust 
standard error is used as shown in Table 8 (column 
two). AGE, TENURE and DIROWN remain significantly 
important but at lower significant levels. However, BMEET 
becomes very significant at 1% level. Other variables are 
insignificant in explaining directors’ attendance.
TABLE 8. Comparison of robust analysis using step-wise, logit with robust standard error and Tobit regression with
robust standard error
  Step-wise logistic Logit with robust standard Tobit regression with robust
  β (Wald statistics) error β (p-value) standard error β (p-value)
 OUTMD  0.0589 (0.509) -0.0016 (0.656)
 AGE -0.035 (7.433)*** -0.2074 (0.034)** -0.0009 (0.045)**
 TENURE -0.084 (7.674 )*** -0.0548 (0.041)** -0.0012 (0.016)**
 GENDER  -0.0226 (0.472) -0.01779 (0.254)
 DIROWN -0.028 (4.318 )** -0.0226 (0.054) † -0.0021 (0.007)***
 BSIZE  0.1003 (0.109) 0.0058 (0.030)**
 FRINDP  -1.0236 (0.433) 0.0043 (0.914)
 BMEET 0.099 (3.085) † 0.1464 (0.008)*** 0.0054 (0.016)**
 FSIZE  -0.1273 (0.206) -0.0060 (0.106)
 FP -0.2992 (0.683 -0.0439 (0.113)
 DEBT -(0.037) -0.1318 (0.543) -0.0008 (0.886)
 Constant -(0.478) 1.0849 (0.541) 1.0820 (0.000)
 Percentage correct 92.9% 92.9%
 Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, †p < .10
One criticism of using logit regression is that the value 
of dummy variable for board attendance, i.e. 0 or 1, is set 
subjectively. To overcome that concern, the above model 
is re-estimated using tobit regression (column three). In 
tobit regression, the dependent variable is transformed into 
a continuous variable named as percentage of director’s 
attendance (PERDIRATT) and is calculated as number of 
directors’ non-attendance to the board meetings scaled by 
the total number of board meetings. By doing this, there is 
no need to find any cut off point for percentage of meeting 
attendance. The results of tobit regression produces more 
significant relationships between the variables and they 
reflect the results of logit regression except for board size 
(BSIZE), where it is now significant. AGE and TENURE are 
statistically significant in explaining directors’ attendance 
with older directors and longer tenure directors would 
attend more meetings. DIROWN is very significant at 1% 
level. The greater is the director ownership in a company, 
the greater is his willingness to attend board meetings. 
BSIZE and BMEET are significantly important in explaining 
the dependent variable. Larger board and frequent board 
meetings would lead to lower attendance.
 Overall, it can be concluded that directors’ 
characteristics, such as AGE and TENURE, as well as 
governance structure, such as DIROWN and BMEET, are 
significantly important in explaining director’s attendance. 
Board size is also significant to explain the dependent 
variable when tobit regression is used. DEBT ratio, the 
control variable, remains statistically insignificant in all 
robust analyses.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The main objective of the study is to provide evidence 
concerning the effect of multiple directorships on the 
monitoring role. The results of the study indicate that 
multiple directorships in Malaysia are low in that most 
of the directors have additional outside directorships 
of between 0 and 3, with independent directors having 
more outside directorships and executive directors having 
fewer directorships. Logistic regression analysis shows 
that directors with multiple directorships are more likely 
to be absent from the board meetings. Even though the 
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results do not support that a high number of multiple 
directorships affect the monitoring role as proxied by the 
attendance of meetings, they indicate that the number of 
multiple directorships does matter (i.e. with a positive 
relationship to attend less board meetings). The positive 
relationship of multiple directorships in our study supports 
the current governance practices to reduce the number of 
directorships. The concern about multiple directorships is 
not necessarily about the number of multiple directorships 
but about the characteristics of the directors having 
multiple directorships. The correlation analysis indicates 
the potential problems relating to multiple directorships 
in terms of the less direct incentive for directors to act 
in line with shareholders’ interests and the busyness of 
independent directors reducing the effectiveness in their 
monitoring role.
In addition, the insignificant relationship between 
independent directors and meeting attendance is somewhat 
similar to previous studies in relation to firm performance. 
Thus, the effectiveness of independent directors in relation 
to the monitoring role is an issue that is in line with the 
concern of the MSWG and other regulative bodies. The 
result is also different from Jiraporn et al. (2009) who 
report that a high fraction of independent directors is likely 
to attend more meetings.
The positive significant relationship between director 
shareholding and percentage of meeting attendance 
supports the role of director shareholdings aligning 
the interests of directors with the interests of other 
shareholders. This result is different from Jiraporn et 
al. (2009) who report an insignificant relationship. The 
concentrated ownership in Malaysia may lead to this 
result as shown by the sample of the study that has higher 
director shareholdings.
The results also show that older directors and directors 
with longer tenure are more likely to attend meetings. The 
significant relationship of age and tenure suggests that 
experience may influence the monitoring roles. However, 
the sample of the study also indicates that older directors 
have more outside directorships. Further analysis shows 
that older directors are correlated with independent 
directors. From the busyness perspective, this result 
shows that older directors may be busy and may not play 
their role effectively. However, one possible reason why 
older directors may have more multiple directorships is 
that older directors are potentially outside directors who 
may have reached retirement age and can provide more 
commitment to attending board meetings. In addition, 
their experience in tasks pertaining to the board would 
assist them in executing their monitoring roles more 
effectively.
It is argued that resource dependency theory would 
have implication on gender diversity of directors’ 
attendance to board meeting. Regardless of the gender, it is 
expected that those directors with resources, expertise and 
networking would have profound influence on company 
interorganisational relationship and thus would be more 
likely needed to attend meetings. Given the prevalent of 
male directors sitting on Malaysian companies’ boardroom, 
it is predicted that the result would be biased toward male 
directors. However, the result of the study fails to provide 
evidence on the importance of gender diversity possibly 
because of the under-representation of female directors 
on boardroom. As pointed out by Fitzsimmons (2012), 
female directors commonly face four types of obstacles to 
climb up the corporate ladder which are: (i) stereotypes, 
where male dominated boards prefer male candidate as 
their new member; (ii) networking, which remains an 
important hurdle to female directors; (iii) less qualified, 
where female directors are seen to be less qualified in 
many areas; and finally (iv) lacking of role models. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has several limitations. First, this study is 
cross-sectional in nature; therefore, it cannot present the 
changes in the director and board characteristics over the 
years and whether the findings are significant for the other 
years. Future research should use a longitudinal study to 
address this issue. Second, this study does not consider 
the endogeneity effect between the outside directorships 
and attendance of meetings because of the difficulty in 
determining the exogenous variables. Considering this 
issue would provide assurance that the results of the 
study are not affected by simultaneity. Third, this study 
only considers outside directorships from the public 
listed companies. As disclosure of outside directorships 
in private companies is on a voluntary basis, not all 
companies disclose the information. Future research 
should consider the outside directorships of directors in 
private companies to obtain robust results. 
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